

# Tell me what you read, and I will tell you who you are: a novel method for measuring ideology using web browsing data

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Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Melanie Revilla for her always insightful comments, and Yuanmo He for his brilliant computational expertise.

Funding: This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 849165; PI: Melanie Revilla); the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under the "R+D+i projects" programme (grant number PID2019-106867RB-Ioo /AEI/10.13039/501100011033 (2020-2024), PI: Mariano Torcal); and the BBVA foundation under their grant scheme to scientific research teams in economy and digital society, 2019 (PI: Mariano Torcal). Oriol is supported by an ERC Advanced Grant (835079, PI M.C Mills), and Leverhulme Trust Large Centre Grant LCDS (RC-2018-003, PI M.C.Mills)

#### Can we measure ideology with web tracking data?

Direct observations of online behaviours using tracking solutions, or *meters*.



Group of tracking technologies (plug-ins, apps, proxies, etc)



**Installed on participants devices** 



Collect traces left by participants when interacting with their devices online: URLs, apps visited, content that they saw...



# Web tracking data: a new source to measure ideology?



Web tracking data can be used to obtain "objective" measures of participants' media diets

Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 85, Special Issue, 2021, pp. 347-370

#### COMPARING ESTIMATES OF NEWS CONSUMPTION FROM SURVEY AND PASSIVELY COLLECTED BEHAVIORAL DATA

TOBIAS KONITZER
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STEPHANIE ECKMAN
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MARKUS MOBIUS
DAVID ROTHSCHILD\*
DUNCAN J. WATTS

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ARTICLE

#### (Almost) Everything in Moderation: New Evidence on Americans' Online Media Diets

Andrew M. Guess

First published: 19 February 2021 | https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12589 | Citations: 13

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→ This might allow us to measure ideology

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
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
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#### From observed media diets to ideology

We can assume that individuals prefer to read media outlets that they perceive to be "close" to them in the (latent) left-right dimension





# Why would we want to measure ideology with web tracking data?

1. Supplement (online) behavioural data with attitudinal information without the need of self-reports (not always feasible)

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  - Understand and quantify potential errors of self-reports: problems in the centre and the extremes
  - · Create a new, hopefully, better measure of ideology

# THIS STUDY

#### TRI-POL: the triangle of polarization



• Three wave survey combined with web tracking data at the individual level (both PC and mobile data)



- **Cross-quotas:** gender, age, education and region
- Sample size: 1,289 (Spain)
- Spain, Portugal, Italy, Argentina and Chile



#### Data in Brief

Available online 9 May 2023, 109219





Data Article

The dynamics of political and affective polarisation: Datasets for Spain, Portugal, Italy, Argentina, and Chile (2019-2022)

Mariano Torcal <sup>1</sup> ∠ ⋈, Emily Carty <sup>2</sup>, Josep Maria Comellas <sup>3</sup>, Oriol J. Bosch <sup>4</sup>, Zoe Thomson <sup>1</sup>, Danilo Serani <sup>2</sup>
















### Case study for this presentation: Spain



- 1. The left-right dimension is very relevant in Spain
- Spain has a highly partisan, pluralist media system
- 3. And a polarized multiparty system





# ESTIMATING IDEOLOGY WITH WEB TRACKING DATA

# The underlying model

An individual's (i) decision to read a specific media outlet (j) is a function of:

- 1. The ideological distance between them and the outlet  $(d_{ij})$ .
- 2. Plus some user- and media- random effects ( $\alpha_i$  an  $\beta_j$ ), to account for differences in political interest and popularity of media.

$$Pr(Y_{ij} = 1 | \alpha_i, \beta_j, d_{ij}) = Logit(\alpha_i + \beta_j - d_{ij})$$

#### The underlying model



This approach has already been used to measure the ideology and socioeconomic status of individuals based on what accounts they follow on Twitter



General Article

# Tweeting From Left to Right: Is Online Political Communication More Than an Echo Chamber?

Psychological Science 2015, Vol. 26(10) 1531–1542 ⊕ The Author(s) 2015 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0956797615594620 pss.sagepub.com







Pablo Barberá<sup>1</sup>, John T. Jost<sup>1,2,3</sup>, Jonathan Nagler<sup>3</sup>, Ioshua A. Tucker<sup>3</sup>, and Richard Bonneau<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Center for Data Science, <sup>2</sup>Department of Psychology, <sup>3</sup>Department of Politics, and <sup>4</sup>Center for Genomics and Systems Biology, New York University

#### Abstract

We estimated ideological preferences of 3.8 million Twitter users and, using a data set of nearly 150 million tweets concerning 12 political and nonpolitical issues, explored whether online communication resembles an "echo chamber" (as a result of selective exposure and ideological segregation) or a "national conversation." We observed that information was exchanged primarily among individuals with similar ideological preferences in the case of political issues (e.g., 2012 presidential election, 2013 government shutdown) but not many other current events (e.g., 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, 2014 Super Bowl). Discussion of the Newtown shootings in 2012 reflected a dynamic process, beginning as a national conversation before transforming into a polarized exchange. With respect to both political and nonpolitical issues, liberals were more likely than conservatives to engage in cross-ideological dissemination; this is an important asymmetry with respect to the structure of communication that is consistent with psychological theory and research bearing on ideological differences in epistemic, existential, and relational motivation. Overall, we conclude that previous work may have overestimated the degree of ideological segregation in social-media usage.

#### Original Article

# A Method for Estimating Individual Socioeconomic Status of Twitter Users

Sociological Methods & Research I-36

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Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/00491241231168665 journals sagepub.com/home/smr



Yuanmo He Dand Milena Tsvetkova D

#### Abstract


The rise of social media has opened countless opportunities to explore social science questions with new data and methods. However, research on socioeconomic inequality remains constrained by limited individuallevel socioeconomic status (SES) measures in digital trace data. Following Bourdieu, we argue that the commercial and entertainment accounts Twitter users follow reflect their economic and cultural capital. Adapting a political science method for inferring political ideology, we use correspondence analysis to estimate the SES of 3,482,652 Twitter users who follow the accounts of 339 brands in the United States. We validate our estimates with data from the Facebook Marketing application programming interface, selfreported job titles on users' Twitter profiles, and a small survey sample. The results show reasonable correlations with the standard proxies for SES, alongside much weaker or nonsignificant correlations with other demographic variables. The proposed method opens new opportunities for innovative social research on inequality on Twitter and similar online platforms.

Department of Methodology, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London,  $\mathsf{UK}$ 





# From model to estimates: Correspondence Analysis

I adapt Pablo Barbera's approach to measure ideology based on who users follow on Twitter, using **Correspondence Analysis** 



	Oultet,	Outlet <sub>2</sub>	Outlet <sub>3</sub>	
Participant,	1	О	О	
Participant <sub>2</sub>	1	1	О	
Participant <sub>3</sub>	0	0	О	
Participant <sub>4</sub>	1	1	1	
Participant <sub>5</sub>	0	0	1	






# The ideology of media outlets



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
# Predictive validity



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


#### Political attitudes



# Predictive validity






Source

Survey

WebTracking

#### Attitudes towards candidates from...








# Hidden Markov Models to estimate the quality of both sources

- Group of latent class models used to **estimate and correct for measurement error** in categorical, longitudinal data
- Do not require any of data sources to be error-free



# Misclassification error (5 categories)

	Hidden classes				
	Class 1 (Far-left)	Class 2 (Left)	Class 3 (Centre)	Class 4 (Right)	Class 5 (Far- right)
Survey					
Far-left	.82	.03	.00	.00	.02
Left	.18	•94	.03	.02	.00
Centre	.00	.02	.87	.02	.00
Right	.00	.02	.09	.94	.09
Far-right	.00	.00	.01	.02	.89
Web tracking					
Far-left	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00
Left	•55	<b>.4</b> 7	.31	.23	.19
Centre	.14	.12	.16	.11	.15
Right	.30	.39	.52	.64	.64
Far-right	.00	.00	.01	.01	.02


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### How do they compare to the latent "true" ideology?




# CAN WE IMPROVE THE SELF-REPORT?

# Predictive validity



#### **Political attitudes**



# CONCLUSIONS

# Take-home messages

- Promising approach to combine surveys and web tracking data
- It is possible to create a measure of ideology using web tracking data but far from perfect!
- Although survey self-reports do seem to have more problems identifying people on the extremes and the centre, the overall quality of the measure is very high
- There might be avenues for improvement, but the results suggest that surveys do a very good job

# Thanks!

# Questions?

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





#### Correspondence Analysis

Correspondence analysis considers Y, the  $n \times m$  adjacency matrix indicating whether user i (row) follows user j (column), as a representation of a set of points in a multidimensional space. This matrix is converted into the correspondence matrix **P** by dividing by its grand total,  $\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{Y}/\sum_{ij} y_{ij}$ , and used to compute the matrix of standardized residuals, S, where  $\mathbf{S} = \mathbf{D}_r^{1/2} (\mathbf{P} - \mathbf{r} \mathbf{c}^T) \mathbf{D}_c^{1/2}$ , where  $\mathbf{r}$  and  $\mathbf{c}$  are the row and column masses, with  $r_i = \sum_j p_{ij}$  and  $c_j = \mathbf{D}_r^{1/2} (\mathbf{P} - \mathbf{r} \mathbf{c}^T) \mathbf{D}_c^{1/2}$ , where  $\mathbf{r}$  and  $\mathbf{c}$  are the row and column masses, with  $r_i = \sum_j p_{ij}$  and  $c_j = \mathbf{D}_r^{1/2} (\mathbf{P} - \mathbf{r} \mathbf{c}^T) \mathbf{D}_c^{1/2}$ , where  $\mathbf{r}$  and  $\mathbf{c}$  are the row and column masses, with  $r_i = \sum_j p_{ij}$  and  $c_j = \mathbf{D}_r^{1/2} (\mathbf{P} - \mathbf{r} \mathbf{c}^T) \mathbf{D}_c^{1/2}$ , where  $\mathbf{r}$  and  $\mathbf{c}$  are the row and column masses, with  $r_i = \sum_j p_{ij}$  and  $c_j = \mathbf{D}_r^{1/2} (\mathbf{P} - \mathbf{r} \mathbf{c}^T) \mathbf{D}_c^{1/2}$ , where  $\mathbf{r}$  and  $\mathbf{c}$  are the row and column masses, with  $r_i = \sum_j p_{ij}$  and  $c_j = \mathbf{D}_r^{1/2} (\mathbf{P} - \mathbf{c}^T) \mathbf{D}_c^{1/2}$ .  $\sum_{i} p_{ij}$ , which are then used to construct the diagonal matrices  $\mathbf{D}_r = \operatorname{diag}(\mathbf{r})$  and  $\mathbf{D}_c = \operatorname{diag}(\mathbf{c})$ . As described in Bonica (2013b), this step is equivalent to including the random effects  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_i$ in the estimation. S is therefore a matrix of residuals between the observed and expected values based on the marginal distribution of the following matrix Y; and correspondence analysis will scale the rows and columns under the assumption that these deviations respond to the distance between them on a latent multidimensional space.

# Self-reported and predicted ideology, by party proximity





# Predictive validity



#### **Voting intention**

